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Abstract: This article examines the relationship between 
religion and the state in Indonesia by exploring how Islam 
is used by political parties to shape the politics. The study 
shows that Islamic politics is a complementary in both 
nationhood and statehood in Indonesia. From the early 
days of the new-born nation-state, Muslims in Indonesia 
had played significant role in shaping the nation; 
nonetheless, they have never dominated the political 
power. Fragmentation among Muslims themselves and 
internal political parties is among the reason why religious 
(Islamic) parties failed in bringing religious identity to the 
state arena. Political subordination-inclusion-ignorance-
confrontation is the circular game that features Islamic 
politics in Indonesia. The debatable issue on shari>‘ah law, 
which is frequently used by Islamic parties, always becomes 
the core problem of the relation between Islam and the 
state. Even though Islam has played an important role in 
colouring the Indonesian politics, its existence remains 
complementary. 
Keywords: Islamic parties, constitution, shari>‘ah. 
Introduction 
The discussion of Islam in Indonesia had been marginalized in the 
global arena in the beginning of twentieth century. Although Indonesia 
is the most populous Muslim country, it is sometimes perceived to play 
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 The earlier version of this paper was presented at The 12th Annual International 
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less significant role in shaping the world Islam. Looking at Islam as a 
‘political power’ frequently refers to its role in its center, i.e. the Middle 
East. The reason could be; first, Muslims in Indonesia are perceived 
‘less Islamic’ compared to those in the Middle East; second, Islam as 
politics has never been a single political majority power in the country. 
Only very recently, after some tragedies such as Bali bombings and 
regional link of Jamaah Islamiyah, and the current emergence of very 
view Islamic parties, does the discussion on Islam in Indonesia invite 
wider concerns. 
As reflected strongly by Wahab Hasbullah2 in the early days of a 
new born state, it is difficult to deny that Islam could not be separated 
from Indonesian politics. Despite the fact that Indonesia is not an 
Islamic state, it is neither a secular one. We may call it a religion-based 
state. Pancasila-five principles3, the foundation of the state has so far 
been established. “Belief in One God”, the first principle, is perceived 
as addressing and accommodating religious matters. It is believed that 
Pancasila has a fundamental element in the separation between religion 
and the state. As it has been noted that Pancasila does not 
acknowledge the word “secularism”, or a firm separation between 
religion and politics, or insistence that religion has no place in the state. 
Constitutionally, furthermore, the Article no. 29 (1) of the 1945 
constitution states that “The state shall be based upon the belief in the 
One and Only God”. Although to some extent it limits 
acknowledgement to six officially recognized religions (Buddhism, 
Catholic, Hinduism, Islam, Protestantism, and recently Confucianism), 
the Article 29 (2) provides that “The state guarantees all persons the 
freedom of worship, each according to his/her own religion or belief”. 
A scholar stresses that to maintain a commitment to an egalitarian and 
pluralistic society, Pancasila has to abstain from favoring a particular 
religion as privileged by the state.4 
 

“If someone is able to separate sugar from its sweetness, he will be able to 
separate Islam from politics”. See Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: 
Indonesia in the 1990s (Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), p. 162.
3 Founded in 1945: belief in one supreme God, humanitarianism, nationalism express-
ed in the unity of Indonesia, consultative democracy, and social justice. 
4 A. An-Naim, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari>‘ah (Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 262. See also J. Fox, A World Survey of Religion and 
the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 202. 
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In this paper, I argue that Islamic politics is a complementary in 
both nationhood and statehood in Indonesia. Since Independence, 
Muslim play significant role in shaping the nation; yet, they have never 
dominated the political power. It is mainly because fragmentation of 
Muslim leaders and Indonesians, arguably, tend to be reluctant in 
bringing religious identity to the state arena. Greg Fealy points out that 
the internal disagreement and rivalries has become the reason why 
Islam has not enjoyed greater power as an autonomous legitimate 
power.5 Additionally, political Islam has long been marginalized and 
distrusted by the state, i.e. the Soekarno and the Soeharto regimes to 
run the country. Marginalization of Islam sometimes claimed by 
Islamic parties coin the voices of Muslim within the state. However, by 
accommodating religious matters; such as Ministry of Religious affairs, 
addressing Islamic economic systems e.g. Bank Syari’a, Islamic 
Jurisprudence; within the state is intelligently set up by the state actors 
to reduce potential power of political Islam. Thus, the internal conflict 
and distrust of the state become the reason why Islam has never 
dominated the major political power. 
The essay begins looking at short history of Islam followed by the 
characteristic of the religion in Indonesia. Next, I look briefly at the 
debate on the implementation of shari>‘ah law. This matter becomes 
relevant because the distinction of the state and the religion function is 
mainly about the shari>‘ah law. At this point, I employ the work of 
Andrea Teti and Andrea Mura on ‘Islamism’6. Teti and Mura point out 
that “Islamism is a set of political and social movements aiming to 
‘bring Islam back’ into politics and society”7. Furthermore, the term 
‘Islamism’ or ‘Islamist’ groups might be alien in the Muslim world; so, 
it is important to look at Islam either as purely a religion or a politics- 
Islam politics. Woodward defines ‘Islamist’ as “those parties which 
advocate implementation of shari>‘ah through either legislation or 
persuasion”8. Not less important term is the call for ‘Islamic 
 
5 Greg Fealy, “Limits of Indonesian Political Islam,” in S. Akbarsadeh and A. Saeed 
(eds), Islam and Political Legitimacy (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 
158. 
6 Teti and Mura, “Islam and Islamism,” in J. Hayness (ed.), Routledge Handbook of 
Religion and Politics (London and New York: Routledge, 2008). 
7 Ibid., p. 102. 
8 Mark Woodward, “Indonesia’s Religious Political Parties: Democratic Consolidation 
and Security in Post-New Order Indonesia,” Asian Survey, vol. 4, no. 1 (2008), p. 51. 
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revivalism’ over the past decades from within the Muslim world 
perceiving Islam to have fallen behind major world’s civilization also 
critical to analyze. Thus, understanding both perspectives, Islamism 
and Islamic revivalism, is useful in studying Islam in Indonesia. 
In the next session I will discuss the role of political parties, 
particularly Islamic parties, in shaping Indonesian politics. In this 
regard, I apply the term ‘politicizing religion’ or ‘religion politicized’ to 
refer to the use of religion for political purposes. In this regard, the so-
called “political Islam” is attributable on how religion politicized. A 
prominent young Indonesian scholar defines political Islam as any 
“efforts that promote Muslim aspirations and carry an Islamic agenda 
into laws and government policy through electoral process and 
representative (legislative) institution”.9 As in an Indonesia case, some 
religious parties have very often used religious attributes; such as text, 
organization, to achieve their own longer term agenda or for short 
term purposes, e.g. to gain vote in election. The question is how 
religious parties use religious matters in the politics? And a conclusion 
will be drawn in the end of this paper.  
Islam In Indonesia 
Brief History 
How Islam spread and who brought the religion in the archipelago 
is critical questions. Importantly, how the religion becomes the 
majority in a nation which is initially founded on different widespread 
kingdoms in just less than a century.10 To answer these questions 
scholars have different historical point of views. A Duct scholar, 
Snouck Hurgronje, claimed that Islam brought by middlemen in trade 
between the Middle east and Nusantara11 and the Malay world. While 
doing business they also propagated Islam into communities who had 
different beliefs such Hinduism, Buddhism, and indigenous belief. 
 
9 A. Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory,” Asian 
Survey, vol. 44, issue 5 (2004), p. 670. 
10 It has been noted that under-25 generation had made up more than two hundred 
population strikingly in part of the great deal of Islamization of Indonesia, R. Wright, 
“Islam’s New Face Visible in a Changing Indonesia,” Online Los Angeles Times, 
Wednesday, December 27, 2000. 
11 Nusantara literally means archipelago, a name used by the Western colonial such as 
Portuguese, Duct, and British to refer to archipelagos along Sumatra, Java, Bali, 
Sulawesi, and Moluccas.  
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These middlemen followed by the Arabs called Syarif or Sayyid12, to 
complete the spreading of Islam either as “priests”, “priest-princes” or 
Sultans13. They were believed mostly as the descendants of the Prophet 
Muhammad. However, Azyumardi Azra mentions that in Indonesian 
historians believe that the religion began to widespread directly from 
Arabia in the first century A.H./seventh century C.E. This theory is 
based on the style of gravestones at Pasai, North Sumatra especially 
one dated 27 September 1428, which is similar to the grave of Maulana 
Malik Ibrahim (d. 1419) in Gresik, East Java.14 
In the next expansion, Islam became a new belief in the Nusantara. 
Benedict Anderson noted that the religion widespread through trading 
not conquest. Rather than revolutionary, it was assimilative 
penetration. Anderson illustrates the dissemination by arguing that: 
… Islam came to the archipelago on the heels not of 
conquest but of trade. It was first brought by traders and has 
never lost the marks of its provenance, developing its 
strongest hold in the immediate, commercial rather than the 
upper, official or lower, peasant strata. After an initial period 
of zealotry, the devout Islamic groups were more or less 
absorbed into the patrimonial state.15 
It could be true to accept Anderson’s theory to attribute the 
penetration in the early days especially in Javanese kingdoms such as 
Mataram and Kediri. Yet, the other penetration, in fact, was through 
war and conquest. Once Islam had been ‘officially’ embraced by local 
kings, the local kingdoms sometimes justified Islam to conquer their 
neighboring ‘states’ as represented by desperate story of local wars in 
the eastern region of Indonesia. For example, the well-noted history of 
Sultan Hasanuddin in Gowa, propagated Islam trough war in its 
neighbors by attacking Bone, Butan, and until the Moluccas 
 
12 Syarif and Sayyid still used by Arabs descendents in some parts of Indonesia, e.g. in 
Ampel in East Java and in Mandar in the western Sulawesi Pennisula. 
13 Sultan also exists in Jogyakarta, Central Java, Pekanbaru Sumatra, Ternate in 
Moluccas and Pasir in Kalimantan. These mainly occur in former Islamic kingdoms, 
where local people keep their cultural but not in political term. 
14 Azyumardi Azra, Islam in the Indonesian World: An Account of Institutional Formation 
(Jakarta: Mizan, 2006), p. 11. 
15 Benedict Anderson, Language of Power, Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 68. 
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archipelagoes.16 However, this focus of this paper does not cover the 
history of penetration of Islam in Indonesia. 
Along the historical journey of Indonesia as a nation-state, Islam 
also grew remarkably. During the Duct and Japanese colonialism, 
Muslims and their leaders had taken leading role in struggling for 
independence. Many well-known heroes were ulama (Muslim scholars) 
who not only thought and led communities in spiritual or religious 
matters, but also became troop leaders against colonialism. Religious 
organizations such as Muhammadiyah (founded in 1912), Persis 
(1920), and Nahdatul Ulama (1926) were the main pockets for fighters 
against the Duct and Japanese occupation. In short, both Muslims and 
Islamic organizations have a prominent role in founding Indonesia. 
With the emergence of Muhammadiyah, Persis and NU, the 
interpretation of Islam also differed in the so-called “modernist” and 
“traditionalist” mainstream groups.  
According to Burhanuddin, for modernist groups, such as 
Muhammadiyah and Persis, to comprehend and implement Islam, they 
follow the salaf method which is to prioritize on the Islamic texts (the 
Qur’an and Hadits). Thoughts of Ibnu Taimiyah are understood in its 
literal sense in its theological and ritual aspects. Another important 
characteristic of these groups tend to be puritan in religious model and 
rejects cultural factors in religious practices. Literalistic and rationalistic 
are typical of Muhammadiyah and Persis. As for traditionalist group 
mainly referred to NU, firmly maintained traditions established by the 
ulamas in the early period of Islam. The tradition is intended to bridge 
the Muslim community and Islamic texts. Thus, the distinction of 
modernist and traditionalist groups lay not only in their views of 
religion, but also orientation on culture.17 
There were several elements underlying the contrasting political 
behavior of NU and Masyumi. First, both parties tended to see 
themselves as direct competitors for Muslim constituency and both 
vied for control of the Department of Religious Affairs with its 
lucrative patronage opportunities and capacity to influence Islamic 
 
16 For further notes on the war penetration, see for example, Barbara Andaya, The 
Heritage of Aru Palakka: A History of South Sulawesi in the Seventeenth Century (The Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1981). 
17 Burhanuddin, “Mainstream Islam in Indonesia,” in R. Sukma and C. Joewono (eds), 
Islamic Thought and Movements in Contemporary Indonesia (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2007), pp. 29-31. 
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activities at the grassroots level. Finally, NU tended to adopt a more 
pragmatic and accommodative approach to politics than Masyumi did. 
NU used politics as a means of securing or protecting its sectional 
interests, particularly insofar as access to government patronage and 
the religious bureaucracy were concerned. In pursuing these interests, 
flexibility, moderation and a capacity for compromise became defining 
feature of NU’s behavior. The Masyumi, by contrast, emphasized 
resoluteness and consistency in their approach to politics. They were 
reluctant to compromise on core matters of policy and frequently 
quoted passages from the Qur’an and hadith enjoining steadfastness 
and commitment to what is deemed right. In practical politics, these 
differences inclined NU and Masyumi towards alliances with non-
Islamic parties rather than each other. NU was drawn to the 
Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), with its populist, Java-centric 
orientation; Masyumi found co-operation with the technocratic 
Socialist Party (PSI) and outer island-based Christian parties. Only on 
overtly Islamic issues such as the Jakarta Charter did NU and Masyumi 
co-operate closely.18 
When Indonesia became a new nation-state, Islam remained as the 
main belief. It is not clear how Islam suddenly became the majority of 
religion in a period less than one century. However, the way 
Indonesian Muslims interpret and understand the religion has been 
different. The difference is based on the cultural background which is 
so diverse in Indonesia. In the so-called aliran (literally means ‘stream’), 
the American anthropologist, Clifford Geertz classified the streams 
within Islam itself into santri, abangan, and abangan. Geertz defines aliran 
as “comprehensive patterns of social integration”.19 Doogue and 
Kirkwood explains this category20: 
Santri Muslims, literally means Muslim students, i.e. 
Muslims, who devout and orthodox in their practice of 
Islam. Originally this term referred to Muslims who were 
educated in pesantren, but it now includes all orthodox 
 
18 Fealy, “Limits of Indonesian Political Islam,” pp. 158-9. 
19 Clifford Geertz, “The Javanese Village,” in G. W. Skinner (ed.), Local, Ethnic, and 
National Loyalties in Village Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 57. 
20 Doogue and Kirkwood, Tomorrow’s Islam: Uniting Age-Old Beliefs and a Modern World 
(Sydney: ABC Books, 2005), p. 274. 
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believers who may not necessarily have a pesantren 
background; 
Abangan Muslims, who combine elements of the prior 
indigenous, animist, Buddhist and Hindu beliefs with Islam, 
and they tend to be more nominal and less practicing as 
Muslims; 
Priyayi Muslims, who belong to the Javanese aristocracy and 
combine abangan beliefs with Javanese courtly culture. Since 
the global resurgence of Islam in 1970s and 1980s, many 
abangan and priyayi believers have become santri, and there 
has been a so-called ‘santri-fication’ of Islam. 
Arguably, this category might be less relevant in today’s socio-
cultural Indonesian Muslims; yet, we look at the pattern of political 
preference of Muslims in the last two elections, 2004 and 2009, 
Geertz’s category can be traced. It is particularly in within Islamic 
parties. Even, it is argued that despite the two current elections (2004 
and 2009) show the win of nationalist-secular parties is tangible; 
traditional Muslim voters remain choose the parties based on this 
category, e. g. the votes for PPP, PKB and PAN are mainly from santri 
Muslim, as I will discuss this in the next part of this paper. 
It is important to note that Islam in Indonesia is typically 
pluralistic. Plural Islam here means the interpretation of Islam has 
diverse for many Muslims, i.e., there has been no single concept of 
how religion deals with the nation-state, for example. The vast majority 
are Sunni and Shafi’i school of thought. The mainstream of those 
Sunni-based thought belongs to Nahdathul Ulama and 
Muhammadiyah. There is a very view of marginal Shii. Not less 
important is the fact that the existence of indigenous beliefs who 
incorporate animism and Islam or other major recognized religions e.g. 
Hinduism and Buddhism. Those indigenous groups, who were 
sometimes ignored and enforced to any ‘alien’ religions during the 
Soeharto regime, now claim their rights to exist before the state. 
Sharia Law 
The debate of the position of religion, Islam precisely, in the state 
has been major subject in the history of Indonesia’s politics and 
constitution. It is mainly the question on whether the shari>‘ah law is 
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recognized in the constitution.21 It is particularly surrounded on the so-
called Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta), an agreement on 22 June 1945 
among the founding fathers such as Soekarno, Muhammad Hatta, AA 
Maramis, Abikusno Tjoksujoso, Abdulkahar Muzakkir, Agus Salim, 
Ahmad Soebardjo, Wahid Hasyim, and Muhammad Yamin. The 
charter turned out to be the 1945 Constitution. Yet, the un-ending 
bitter debate until nowadays centers around the seven-word clause “… 
dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya” [… 
with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law].22 
Interpretation and implication of the charter was vague, according 
to Greg Fealy. For minimalist group, the obligation to follow shari>‘ah 
law set individual Muslims, not the state. The maximalists insist that to 
ensure adherents of Islam commitment to the shari>‘ah was the state’s 
function and the constitutional basis for broad legislation would be 
provided through the charter. Fealy, further, notes that even if most 
Muslim leaders advocate the inclusion of the clause within the 
constitution perceived by nationalist and non-Muslims as an effort to 
create Indonesia an Islamic state, it would not have had this effect. 
Even, the charter was intended “as an adjunct to Pancasila, not 
replacement”; the proposal for Islam to be the official state religion 
never been proposed.23  
In Indonesia, the term “shari>‘ah” is commonly understood 
differently into two meanings. An-Naim illustrates24: 
Shari >‘ah with a capital “S” is used to refer to the totality of 
God’s detailed guidance for humanity. This vision of 
Shari >‘ah is believed to be eternal and universal, but it is to be 
derived from the totality of God’s signs (ayat), which are 
conveyed in the material world, as well as in the Qur’an. 
Shari >‘ah with a small “s”, which is fiqh, is the product of the 
human law-law making process, or ijtihad (juridical reasoning 
by Islamic scholars according to the traditional methodology 
of Islamic jurisprudence. However, strongly believed to be 
 
21 Baswedan, “Political Islam in Indonesia,” p. 669. 
22 For details of the constitution see Lili Romli, Islam Yes, Partai Islam Yes (Yogyakarta: 
Pustaka Pelajar, 2006), pp. 265-6. 
23 Fealy, Limits of Indonesian Political Islam, p. 155. 
24 An-Naim, Islam and the Secular State, p. 245. 
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valid and binding, the product of this process is always 
merely speculative conjecture and necessarily temporary and 
transient. Although fiqh purports to regulate human 
behavior, there is always flexibility and freedom for each 
human being to choose among a range of options without 
fear of committing an offense or sin that warrants 
punishment. 
Politicizing Islam: Political Parties 
One of the crucial questions in relation to the role Islam as well as 
other religions have played in national politics are, among others, how 
religious parties use religion matters in the politics? What are the roles 
of Islamic parties in Indonesia?  
As has been mentioned above, I use the term ‘politicizing religion’ 
or ‘religion politicized’ to refer to the use of religion for political 
purposes. In this section, I attempt to assess how religious matters 
used to negotiate the power with the state. 
Anderson has suggested that by assessing the major socio-political 
roles of religion in the Southeast Asian nations, we might frequently 
express surprise that “religion has always failed politically”. It is true 
that nowhere in the region, with partial exception of Indonesia, have 
religious leaders become Prime Ministers or heads of state. Indonesia 
herself is a marginal case, since the Muslim leaders Muhammad Natsir 
and Sukiman each survived as prime ministers for only a few months. 
However, Anderson further stated: 
“…religion has been a very significant political factor, while 
religious leaders and movements have been great political 
failures-only makes sense if one believes that religion is 
subsumed under politics, and only if one assumes that 
religious people in politics see politics in the way that 
‘secular’ people do. What I am suggesting is simply that 
from the religious perspective what looks like major political 
failure may be quite inconsequential, and that ‘failure’ in, say, 
Jakarta, may not mean failure among millions of ordinary 
Indonesians.”25 
 
25 B. Anderson, ‘”Religion and Politics in Indonesia since Independence,” in Benedict 
R.O.G Anderson et al, Religion and Social Ethos in Indonesia (Victoria: The Australia-
Indonesia Association and the Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 
1975), p. 22. 
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It is true, Anderson’s suggestion then proved again when the 
prominent Muslim leader, Abdurrahman Wahid, had been toppled 
down and had less than one period of administration in 1999-2001. 
Being a long time decidedly secular state, a remarkable growing Islamic 
identity, such as new political parties, Islamic schools, civic groups, 
Islam media, has redefined Indonesia, according Wright. It is believed 
that 75 percent of Indonesian Muslims wished to play important role 
in society and government policy, and about 54 percent of public 
yearned for religious leaders to get involve vigorously in the politics.26 
After Independence until the End of the New Order Period 
Acknowledged by the Soekarno regime as the mainstream of 
Muslim’s socio-political representation, NU and Muhammadiyah 
became stronger. However, as Fealy argues that lack of solidarity and 
conflict between these organizations became a main element in the 
political dynamic from the late 1950s, when Soekarno and the army 
were approaching Indonesia towards the authoritarian Guided 
Democracy. Masyumi was firmly opposed to toppling down of 
parliamentary democracy, arguing that it was not only violate the 
community’s democratic rights but also contrary to the Islamic 
principle that supported consultation (musyawarah) and deliberation 
(mufakat) between the government and people. By contrast, NU 
halfheartedly agreed to Guided Democracy, fearing that its own 
interest as well as those of the broader Muslim community would be 
endangered if it rejected to involve. It is believed that the agreement 
and involvement of NU was important to approach Soekarno’s 
Guided Democracy. In the further step, Soekarno exposed his new 
regime as mixing the diversity of Indonesian politics. Then, the 
president Soekarno mad up the acronym Nasakom (i.e. Nasinalis-Agama-
Komunis or Nationalist-Religion-Communist) to portray the supposed 
combination of these different elements.27 Perhaps, it is the first idea 
to unite between communism and religion in the world. 
It is not surprising, as a result of Masyumi disagreement, the 
Soekarno regime banned Masyumi in 1960. In 1962 senior Masyumi 
leaders were arrested and remained under arrest until 1967. The 
parliament restricted by reducing Islamic parties into just 25 percent, 
 
26 Wright, Los Angeles Times, Wednesday, December 27, 2000. 
27 Fealy, “Limits of Indonesian Political Islam,” p. 159.  
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down to 45 percent in the 1955 democratically elected parliament. The 
regime also decreased NU’s involvement over the direction of 
government. In this case, Fealy suggests that marginalization of Islam 
politics was the consequence of the lack solidarity of Islamic groups in 
the Soekarno regime.28 
In 1966 the New Order emerged. Led by general Soeharto, the 
regime isolated and detained Soekarno. The Soeharto regime, 
according to Fealy, placed Islam as a political force into suspicious and 
distrusted Muslims leaders. Despite it allowed the founding of new 
Islamic party, Parmusi (the Indonesian Muslim Party) in 1967, it did 
not permit to rehabilitate Masyumi. Similar with Soekarno regime, the 
New Order and particularly Soeharto himself believed that Islamic 
political parties were potential power challengers that could undermine 
the secular based state. Accordingly, by domesticating Islamic parties, 
Muslim elites and proponents of shari>‘ah law not only failed to make 
Islamic state, but also they were marginalized and perceived as 
“minorities” or “outsiders” in the state. They were frequently 
perceived as anti Pancasila. Again, as it has been suggested that in the 
early the New Order regime the political Islam was “constitutionally, 
physically, electorally, bureaucratically, and symbolically defeated.”29 
In addition, in the Soeharto regime, Islam had been “politicized”, 
according to Hefner. Suspecting Islam as potential power contender to 
national politics, the government initiated and enforced all social and 
political groups, including religious organizations, to use Pancasila as 
their “sole foundation” (asas tunggal). It was believed that by pushing 
socio-political organizations under the Pancasila base policy, Muslims 
considered their organization to have been completely destructed. 
Party of Unity and Development (PPP), the only Islamic party at that 
period, for example, bitterly accepted the government’s policy. The 
policy considered similar to the earlier Dutch colonial effort of 
allowing “Islamic religion but ruthlessly repressing all forms of political 
Islam”. 30 
 
28 Ibid., p. 160.  
29 B. Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2003), p. 2. 
30 Hefner, Civil Islam, pp. 121-122. Further discussion on this, see Anthony Reid, 
“Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 
vol. 26, no. 2 (1967), pp. 267-283. 

Islamic Parties and the Politics of Constitutionalism 
379 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 06, Number 02, December 2012 
Furthermore, the relation between the state and Islam had been 
fluctuated. However, as Taba notes a number of accommodative 
actions by the New Order regime to Muslim, as shown in the table 
below: 
Figure 1: Number of accommodative actions by the New Order regime 
to Muslim 
Cases Year  Initiative State & Muslims Response 
The demand to 
abolish the ban 
using Jilbab in 
schools 
1980s/ear
ly 1999s 
Muslims the state accommodated the 
demand and in 1991 the ban 
was abolished 
National 
Education 
Constitution 
Draft 
1988 State Created strong reaction among 
Muslims. However, Muslims’ 
opposition reduced through 
lobbying by Muslim leaders. 
The government finally 
accommodated Muslims’ 
demand and all the drafts 
which considered against 
Islamic values were rejected. 
Regulation on education that 
not pro Islamic education was 
rejected. 
Draft of 
Religious 
Jurisprudence 
1988 State Muslims responded 
enthusiastically because it was 
believed giving support for 
Muslim interest  
SDSB 
(gambling) 
1990s Muslim Government accept Muslims 
objection and the gambling 
was banned 
YABMP 
(Muslim-
Pancasila 
Foundation) 
1980s & 
1990s 
State/president Muslims responded positively 
to gain fund-support to build 
mosques around Indonesia 
Joint-Degree 
between 
Ministry of 
Home Affairs & 
Religious 
1990s  State Muslims accepted the initiative 
of government to arrange the 
religious charity (zakat) 
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Cases Year  Initiative State & Muslims Response 
Ministry 
Musmalat Bank 1990s State Muslims positively the 
establishing of the so-called 
Bank Shari >‘ah Muamalat 
Muslim Scholars 
Association 
(ICMI) 
1990s Muslim, then 
state took the 
initiative 
State supported and Muslims 
broadly advocated 
Istiqlal Festival 1990 Muslim 
(particularly 
ICMI 
State supported even 
sponsored. 
Source: Lili Romli, Islam Yes, Partai Islam Yes (2006), pp. 89-91, adapted Abdul 
Azis Thaba, Islam dan Negara dalam Politik Orde Baru [Islam and the 
state in the Politics of the New Order] (1996), pp. 313-5. 
Additionally, Effendy classified the New Order regime’s 
accommodation into four kinds: (1) structural; mainly on education, (2) 
legislative; the National Education Law, religious court, and the 
compilation of Islamic jurisprudence, reversal of policy on jilbab, 
religious alms, annulment of lottery, (3) infrastructural; Muslim 
Pancasila Foundation, “religious project” in Five-Year Development 
Plan, (4) cultural; adoption of Islamic (Arabic?) idiom into Bahasa 
Indonesia.31 Additionally, in the early years of the New Order, the 
founding of Majlis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesia’s Council of Ulama’s-
MUI) considered “as a toll to keep politically minded Islamic 
organizations in check”, according Gelling.32 
From socio-political perspective, as Romli has suggested that the 
founding of the Indonesian Muslim Scholars Association (ICMI) was 
phenomenal accommodation of Soeharto regime. Led by Habibie, 
hundreds of Muslim prominent leaders from diverse background were 
collected to support the New Order interests. Habibie’s unique origin 
was important because he was not from prominent Islamic groups but 
a Muslim technocrat and bureaucratic based.33 He himself was 
 
31 Effendy, Islam and the State, pp. 151-171. 
32 P. Gelling, “Islamic Group Gain Power in Indonesia,” online New York Times, 
October 7, 2008. 
33 Romli, Islam Yes, Partai Islam Yes, pp. 92-96. 
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sometimes called “super minister” due to a number of essential 
ministries and departments that he headed, then replaced President 
Soeharto. The pros-cons of the ICMI founding featured Muslims 
position, particularly Islamic organization, in the 1990s of New 
Order.34 In short, the so-called “Pancasila Democracy”, the Soeharto 
regime effectively isolated political Islam. 
During Reformasi and transition era 
There have been significant changes in Indonesian politics after 
the post-Soeharto regime in 1998. It included the emergence of a many 
Islamic parties. During 1998 and 1999, the political parties were 
mushrooming, including Islamic parties. In this era, as reported that 
there were about 184 political parties, but 148 of which proposed to 
establish and yet only 141 among them were approved. And there were 
only 48 parties joined the general elections.35 And 21 out of 42 parties 
were categorized as Islamic; typically clearly use Islam as their 
ideological foundation.36 Woodward classifies the parties into four 
main groups37: 
Clearly secular parties resisted Arab-like variant of Islam and 
a more noticeable role of Islam in politics. It appealed to 
Hindus, Christians and other. Indonesian Democratic Party-
Struggle (PDIP) and the Golkar Party were the categories in 
this group. 
Islamic parties led by famous Muslim leaders that focus their 
segments on Muslim community. PKB and PAN could be 
classified in this group. 
Islamic parties that support a significant position within 
politics and focus on family law, Bank shari>‘ah and 
advocated anti-pornographic and “porno action” law. PKS, 
PBB, and PPP represented this category. 
A small number of Christian parties. 
 
34 Further discussion on ICMI and Islam, see D. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1995).  
35 Romli, Islam Yes, Partai Islam Yes, p. 107. 
36 Effendi, Islam in Contemporary Indonesian Politics, p. 180.  
37 Mark R. Woodward, “Indonesia’s Religious Political Parties: Democratic 
Consolidation and Security in Post-New Order Indonesia,” Asian Survey, vol. 4, no. 1 
(2008), pp. 48-9. 

Mukrimin 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 06, Number 02, December 2012 
382 
Woodward also remarks that in 1999 election the secular parties, 
PDI-P and the Golkar, gained 66.16 in aggregate votes. And the ‘grey’ 
parties such as PKB and PAN also came into top ten major parties.38 It 
is noteworthy that the major political parties were reliant heavily on 
their ‘charismatic’ or symbolic leaders39. For example, Megawati’s PDI-
P, Abdurrahman Wahid’s PKB, and Amien Rais’ PAN.  
Although religious parties are not dominated by Islam, and there 
are Catholic and Protestant parties as well, the establishment of Islamic 
parties has opened up a public concern. Motives and motivation of the 
emergence of so many Islamic parties had been questioned by many 
intellectuals and political analysts. Political inference and the 
repercussions for the future of Indonesia politics was also of the 
concerns. Importantly, the concern of minority groups, like Catholic 
and Protestants, who were supported by secular groups believed that 
the rise of so many Islamic parties leaded to anxiety that such religion-
based parties might increase “political sectarianism”. For minority 
groups, the rise of Islamic parties could eventually lead to national 
disintegration.40 Concern of the minority groups is not new. Azra 
states, “It is not secret that for many years Christians have believed 
that Muslims generally still support the establishment of an Islamic 
state in Indonesia”41. The increase suspicious of non-Muslim groups is 
understandable because many political parties replaced their ideological 
foundation from Pancasila to Islam. 
However, many Indonesia Muslim figures believe that the 
emergence of Islamic parties after the fall of Soeharto regime was 
simply euphoria of era reformasi, which is generally understood by the 
Muslim elites to mean political freedom and democracy. That was not 
surprising because many Muslim political leaders were suppressed and 
marginalized during the New Order regime. Yet, it was commonly 
believed as counterproductive for the unity and welfare of Indonesian 
 
38 Ibid., p. 49. 
39 For the discussion of ‘charismatic leader” in Indonesian politics, see B. Anderson, 
Language and Power, Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornel University 
Press, 1990). 
40 Azyumardi Azra, Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy: Dynamics in a Global Context (Jakarta: 
Solstice and International Centre for Islam and Pluralism, 2006), p. 6.  
41 Ibid., p. 28. 
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Muslim society.42 In fact, the rise of so many Islamic parties 
exacerbated the fragmentation of Muslim politics. Again Anderson’s 
thesis on the failure of political Islam in during reformasi era proved to 
be true. It should be kept in mind, however, that they played critical 
role in stabilizing Indonesia’ peaceful transition to democracy. Even, 
their participations and contention in peaceful way through the 
elections were constructive.43  
Commenting the failure of Islamic parties in the 1999 election, 
Effendy stresses two aspects should be taken into account. First, the 
view of religious loyalty will automatically be followed by political 
endorsement has not occurred. In fact, Islamic parties had no enough 
acknowledgement of socio-cultural and demographic background of 
Indonesian voters that always change. Religious issues could not totally 
be raised to shape political preference, even if the aliran politics still 
influential. Second, the image of Islamic parties, frequently equated 
with Islamic state or the issue of the incorporation of the shari>‘ah law 
into the state constitution, was critical factor as well.44 These factors, I 
believe, are attributable to the unpopularity of Islamic parties in the 
2004 and 2009 general elections. 
After reformasi and beyond: future prospects 
It is important to note that the discourse of Islamic state or 
shari>‘ah law re-emerged after the fall of Soeharto regime. Yet, it was 
not risen by political parties but Islamic organizations during this 
period. As Azra has state that in the 2004 election, Islam and Islamic 
issues “did not become the central and big issues”; rather, most 
Indonesians “were concerned mostly with issues they face in the real 
life” such as economic downturn, widespread corruption, law 
enforcement, and other social ills like drugs and poverty.45 
In addition, An-Naim points out that generally the debate 
happened among those proponents who advocate an active role of the 
state in ensuring the Jakarta Charter. They were including Dewan 
Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Preaching Council-
 
42 Ibid., p. 29 
43 Abdulbaki, ‘‘Democratic in Indonesia: from Transition to Consolidation,” Asian 
Journal of Political Sciences, vol. 16, no. 2 (2008), p. 165. 
44 Effendy, Islam in Contemporary Indonesian Politics, pp. 193-4. 
45 Azra, Indonesia, Islam, p. 215. 
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DDII), Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (the Indonesian 
Muslims’ World Solidarity-KISDI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (the 
Indonesian Mujahidin Council-MMI), Front Pembela Islam (the Islam 
Defender Front-FPI), Laskar Jihad, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and 
others. The groups such as Nahdathul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and such 
Islamic non-governmental organizations as Paramadina, Jaringan Islam 
Liberal (Islam-Liberal Network-JIL), and others firmly opposed the 
idea of formal state’s sponsor of shari>‘ah law.46 
However, by and large, Indonesian Muslims’ commitment to 
democracy is obvious as shown in general elections over the last 
decade. In 1999 and 2004 general elections, voter participation was 
high: 91 percent and 84 percent respectively, and 77 percent for 2004 
presidential election. Broad support of Muslim communities for 
democracy is consistently strong. In 2008, 82 percent of Muslim 
preferred democracy as the best political system for Indonesia, 
according to a poll.47 This shows that Indonesian’s recent political 
development through democracy has been consolidated.  
Furthermore, during this period, a number of significant 
developments of democratic process are significant. Abdulbaki 
confirms that constitutional amendments, for example, that guarantee 
of freedom of expression and association and media as well, are good 
efforts. Also significantly, the elimination of the possible re-emergence 
of a new presidential dictatorship has taken place. And political parties 
are no longer urged to adopt Pancasila as the sole foundation by 
removing the ideological uniformity on the political party’s base.48 
The idea of implementing shari>‘ah law, particularly through 
constitutional change in the 2009 election is mainly supported by very 
view parties in the parliament. It is pretty much similar with the 2004 
election. However, the non-formal parties, groups outside parliaments, 
such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Islamic groups still struggle 
to be included in the state’s power to ensure the shari>‘ah law. Equally 
essential, thanks to the implementation of decentralization, the debate 
 
46 An-Naim, Islam and the Secular State, p. 231. See also the report of the Jakarta Post, 
Tuesday, 18 September 2007, available at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/print/-
152411 [consulted, 8 June 2011]. 
47 Greg Fealy, “Indonesia: Pietism and Compromising for Power,” in A. Bubalo et al 
(eds), Zealous Democrat (Lowy Institute, 2008), pp. 55-6. 
48 Abdulbaki, ‘‘Democratic in Indonesia,” pp. 156-8. 
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of shari>‘ah law also shifted from national to local issue. From more 
than four hundred districts/municipalities and 32 provinces, only very 
view of them have passed any shari>‘ah-based local regulations.49 As 
Ramage has stated, it was not Islamic parties, but by secular ones, 
dominating the passing of local shari>‘ah regulations. The “shari>‘ah-
nization” movement in a small number of districts believed 
undermining Indonesia’s pluralism and diversity.50 Another example of 
shari>‘ah-based issue is the anti-pornography bill that seems less vocal 
now in the implementation.51 
In the very recent calculation, Greg Fealy stresses “of the nine 
general elections held since 1955, Islamic parties have never gained 
more than 44 percent of vote-that is less than half of the Muslim 
vote”. Even in the 2004 and 2009 elections, they obtained only about 
38 percent of the vote.52 A similar prediction of an Indonesian 
prominent historian is rather convinced that Islamic parties will not 
rise “as a big political force in the elections in 2009” because “re-
invigorated Islamic discourse that practically divided the ummah into 
several clusters of religious orientation” affects the political 
development.53 The table below depicts comparison of the top-list 
party votes in 2004 and 2009 general elections: 
 
49 It is arguably debatable that whether the local regulations were genuinely shari>‘ah or 
not because as far as I concern the claim for shari>‘ah regulations, such as the obligation 
to have the Koran acquisition was not purely shari>‘ah law. Furthermore, the only one 
province, i.e. Aceh has officially claims as specific region to implement the shari>‘ah; 
yet, a number of Acehnese colleagues are convinced that what the Acehnese 
government claims abouth shari>‘ah was totally different with the reality. In fact, there 
is not distinctive difference between Aceh province and the rest of 32 provinces of 
Indonesia. The Jakarta Post released that 250 shari>‘ah bylaw have been passed in South 
Sulawesi, West Java, Banten, West Sumatra, West Kalimantan and Aceh, The Jakarta 
Post, Tuesday, 18 September 2007, available at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/-
print/152411 [consulted, 8 June 2011]. 
50 Ramage, Indonesia Democracy First, pp. 147-8. 
51 Further discussion, see P. Allen, “Challenging Diversity?: Indonesia’s Anti-
Pornography Bil,” Asian Studies Review, vol. 31 (2007), pp. 101-115. 
52 Fealy, “Islamic lens the wrong way to see Indonesia,” online The Jakarta Post, 
Saturday, 14 March 2009, available at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/print/203203 
[consulted, 8 June 2011]. 
53 Interview The Jakarta Post with Taufik Abdullah, online The Jakarta Post, Tuesday, 
18 September 2007, available at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/print/152411 
[consulted, 8 June 2011]. 
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Figure 2: Comparison of the Top-list Party Votes in 2004 and 2009 
General Elections 
Party 2004 (%) 2009 (%) Ideology/Base 
Democrat  7.45% 20.36% Secular-nationalist  
PDIP 18.53 14.32 Secular-nationalist 
Golkar 21.58% 14.24 Secular-nationalist 
PKS  7.34%  8.46% Islam 
PAN  6.44%  6.36% Islam & nationalist 
PPP  8.15%  5.46% Islam 
PKB  8.15%  5.12% Islam & nationalist 
Gerindra  n. a.   4.47% Secular-nationalist 
Hanura  n. a.  3. 52% Secular-nationalist 
PBB  2.62%   1.98% Islam 
Source: Indonesia’s Election Commission (KPU), available at http://www.-
kpu.go.id and adapted by the writer. 
 
The result of the 2009 election raises the anxiety about the 
emergence of Islamic parties particularly Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (the 
Prosperous Justice Party-PKS). Employing the Egyptian Islamist 
Muslim Brotherhood method, this party has been believed as re-
emerging of Islamist in Indonesia. Although it slightly increases, it is 
surprising many when the party ‘only’ achieved more than 8 percent 
because before the election the PKS’s leaders and members strongly 
believed on their calculation that they would gain 20 percent in this 
vote.54 
Again, in general, the Islamic parties will not dominate Indonesia’s 
politics. There are three underlying “classical” factors, according 
Effendy, why they do not gain significant votes in the 2009 election: 
first, “the inability of Islamic parties to translate ideological identity 
into concrete programs”. It is because voters believed that Islam has 
not proven itself as a major in politics. Second, the internal conflict 
and disunity within Islamic parties is also critical reason they failed. 
Finally, philosophical shifting “from being ideologically driven in the 
 
54 Online Channel News Asia, “Indonesian voters lose faith in Islamic Parties,” 
available at: http://wwwchannelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/420229/-
1/.html [consulted, 6 April, 2011]. 
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1940s and 1950s, to pragmatist now” influence the failure of Islamic 
parties.55 
Finally, any attempt to support the consolidating democracy in 
Indonesia is crucial. Skeptical, even pessimistic, view that Islam is not 
compatible with democracy should be answered by solving problems 
that could undermine the democratic values. Indonesia’s challenges of 
democracy, as Azra has suggested, associated with four factors. First, 
prerequisites of democracy, such as education and economic 
development, are less developed. Patrimonialism and corruption still 
rampantly undermine the nation-state development. Second, some 
Indonesia Muslims tend to believe the nostalgia to unite and merge 
religion and politics; by translating into formalization of Islam in 
politics. Third, the lack of democratic culture among political elites and 
Muslim communities also remains the problem. Lastly, the role of civil 
society organizations is fragile too. To support democratic 
consolidation, the pivotal position of Islamic civil society groups has to 
be advocated.56 
Conclusion 
The central argument underlying this paper has been, first, political 
Islam, particularly Islamic (Islamist?) parties, plays significant role in 
the state of Indonesia. Second, the role of Islamic parties has never 
been dominating the national politics. The failure of political Islam 
since independence is due to two main factors: internal conflict among 
themselves and the state pressure. As Abootalebi and Abdulbaki have 
suggested that “the relationship between Islam and the state or the role 
of Islam in political life ranges from subordination of the state to 
Islam… to political accommodation… to political inclusion of Islam… 
to toleration… to ignoring Islam… to direct confrontation” in the 
political landscape of many Muslim countries has also taken place in 
Indonesia.57 
Being the largest Muslim country, in terms of population, 
Indonesia has experienced a relatively short journey to democracy. 
Since independence in 1945, the country ever adopted the so-called 
 
55 Bachtiar Effendy, “Islamic Parties have long been at an Impasse,” on line the Jakarta 
Post, Friday, 17 April 2009, available at: http://www.thejakrtapost.com/print/207338 
[consulted, 1 May 2011].  
56 Azra, Indonesia, Islam, pp. 24-25. 
57 Abdulbaki, ‘‘Democratic in Indonesia,” p. 156. 
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“Guided Democracy” coined by the Soekarno and “Pancasila 
Democracy” forced by Soeharto. Both regimes had politically isolated 
and distrusted Islam as the potential political contender. When the 
New Order dismantled, political landscape created political euphoria 
marked by mushrooming political parties, particularly Islamic-based 
ones, that also confusing Muslims. It is understandable then, 
Indonesian citizen have little experience with real and genuine 
democracy. 
The debatable issue on shari>‘ah law, which is frequently used by 
Islamic parties, always becomes the core problem of the relation 
between Islam and the state. As it has been suggested that Islam and 
Muslims played pivotal role in shaping Indonesian politics; yet, bitterly 
enough to say that the involvement of Islam with Indonesia’s politics 
remains complementary factor. Internal conflict and disunity among 
Islamic parties and the state policy, such as marginalization and 
distrust, are attributable to losing of the parties. It seems that using 
Islam in the political world by elites repeatedly fail to dominate the 
power. In my final remark, I believe that Indonesians themselves tend 
to prefer national (secular) cohesion by choosing nationalist parties 
rather than by bringing Islam into pragmatic politics. [] 
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